No Tears, No Mercy? Rethinking Remorse, Labels, and Neuroscience in the Courtroom

Imagine standing before a judge, accused of a serious crime. Your heart pounds, your palms sweat, but you don't cry. You don’t visibly break down. You simply stand quietly, numb from fear or perhaps incapable of expressing the remorse you truly feel. In the courtroom’s eyes, this silence might signal coldness, guilt, or even danger. But is that fair?

This troubling scenario reflects a core issue facing our justice system today: courts often misunderstand what remorse truly looks like, relying on outdated assumptions rather than scientific reality.

Recently, I spoke with Dr. Colleen M. Berryessa, an Associate Professor at Rutgers University’s School of Criminal Justice, about this very topic. With degrees from Harvard University and the University of Pennsylvania, Dr. Berryessa has dedicated her career to studying how neuroscience, ethics, and psychology shape criminal sentencing.

Through my blog, The Brain’s Canvas, I’ve explored psychopathy, empathy deficits, and the ethics of applying brain science in courtrooms. But our conversation took me deeper—revealing troubling truths about how labels, assumptions, and misconceptions distort justice.

Let’s start with the most misunderstood courtroom emotion: remorse.

When Remorse is Misread

Dr. Berryessa highlighted how much weight courts place on visible remorse:

“Judges look for remorse as proof of good character. But we’re not very good at understanding another person's expressions of remorse—there is no fully objective way to assess it.”

Think about this for a moment. The courtroom expects defendants to show sorrow through tears, apologies, and dramatic displays of guilt. But what about people who simply can’t express remorse in these ways? People with psychopathy, autism, certain mental health conditions, or even cultural backgrounds that discourage public displays of emotion often appear unfeeling—even if inside, they deeply regret their actions.

As Dr. Berryessa explained:

“Some people might genuinely feel remorse but don't express it through crying or obvious shame. They could be from a culture where emotion isn’t openly expressed, or they might be taking medications affecting their emotional expression. Even then, their remorse might not be recognised.”

Here's why this matters: when remorse is misunderstood, sentencing can become unjustly harsh. Courts assume the person feels no guilt or regret—especially problematic for those with psychopathic traits, whose brains literally process emotions differently.

The Danger of Labelling People as ‘Psychopaths’

Why do we make such mistakes about remorse? The answer lies partly in how easily we apply labels. Labels like “psychopath” simplify complex human behaviours into tidy stereotypes. But labels don’t tell the whole story—they obscure it.

Dr. Berryessa pointed out the risk clearly:

“We’re a label-driven society. Once someone is labelled a psychopath, people stop seeing the person as who they are and only see the stereotype.”

Imagine a young person who shows aggressive or unemotional traits. If they're quickly labelled a psychopath, that stigma could follow them forever—even if they later mature, develop empathy, and leave those traits behind. Dr. Berryessa notes this happens often, causing long-term damage to their lives and limiting their chances for fair treatment.

This is especially important because not everyone labelled as a psychopath actually meets clinical criteria. And even when they do, their traits don’t automatically mean they cannot change or improve with help. Labelling reduces a whole person to one harmful stereotype, stripping away their humanity.

Neuroscience Isn’t an Excuse—It’s Context

But why do courts, and the public, cling to these oversimplified labels?

Partly because neuroscience is widely misunderstood.

There's a common fear that brain science might let criminals off the hook by "blaming the brain." However, according to Dr. Berryessa, this idea completely misses the point:

“There’s a misconception that defendants use neuroscience to avoid responsibility. Usually, neuroscience comes into play only after guilt is already established—to help understand behaviour, not excuse it.”

Neuroscience provides context, helping judges and juries understand why someone acted as they did—perhaps due to trauma, a psychiatric condition, or neurological differences. It's not about excusing harmful actions, but rather understanding them. Unfortunately, media coverage often misrepresents neuroscience as a simple "brain-based excuse," creating confusion and mistrust.

As Dr. Berryessa emphasised:

“People want simple answers—they expect to find one problem in the brain that explains everything. But behaviour is complicated. There's no golden ticket.”

Changing How We Think: From Courtroom to Community

So, how can our justice system do better? First, by changing how it understands remorse. Judges and juries need to recognise that emotional expression varies widely across different people and cultures—and silence or calmness doesn't always mean a lack of regret.

Second, courts need to be more cautious with labels like "psychopath." Labels might simplify things temporarily, but they also erase individual stories, potential for growth, and genuine humanity.

Finally, we need to embrace neuroscience not as an excuse but as valuable context.

Understanding why people commit crimes doesn't erase their responsibility. It simply allows us to respond in more humane, effective, and ultimately fair ways.

This shift in thinking is what I aim for in The Brain’s Canvas: Justice isn’t just about punishment—it’s about truly understanding human behaviour first. Because only by understanding can we create a justice system that is genuinely fair.

Acknowledgment:

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Colleen M. Berryessa for generously sharing her valuable insights during our Zoom call on Wednesday, 26th March 2025. Her expertise has significantly enriched my exploration of neuroscience, remorse, and labelling in the criminal justice system.